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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores if fraud or mismanagement in municipal governments can be 
diagnosed or detected in advance of their bankruptcies by financial statement analysis 
using Benford’s Law. Benford’s Law essentially states that the distribution of first digits 
from real world observations would not be uniform, but instead follow a trend where 
numbers with lower first digits (1, 2…) occur more frequently than those with higher first 
digits (…8,9). If a data set does not follow Benford’s distribution, it is likely that the data 
has been manipulated. This widespread phenomenon has been used as a tool to detect 
anomalies in data sets.  The annual financial statements of Jefferson County, Vallejo 
City, and Orange County were analyzed. All the data sets showed overall nonconformity 
to Benford’s Law and therefore indicated that there was the possibility of fraud occurring.  
I find that Benford’s Law, had it been applied in real time to those financial statements, 
would have been able to detect that something was amiss.  That would have been very 
useful because each of those jurisdictions subsequently went bankrupt.  This paper 
demonstrates that Benford’s Law may in some cases be useful as an early indicator to 
detect the possibility of fraud in municipal governments’ financial data.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 This thesis is going to explore if fraud and mismanagement in municipal 
governments that subsequently went bankrupt could have been diagnosed or detected in 
advance of their bankruptcies by financial statement analysis using Benford’s Law.  
Benford’s Law essentially states that the distribution of first digits from real world 
observations would not be uniform, but instead follow a trend where numbers with lower 
first digits (1, 2…) occur more frequently than those with higher first digits (…8,9). If a 
data set does not follow this pattern, it is likely that the data has been manipulated.  With 
the municipalities of Jefferson County, Vallejo City, and Orange County going bankrupt 
amidst controversial circumstances, the question arises: Did these municipalities ever 
intentionally manipulate their financial data? This paper aims to answer the question 
whether or not Benford’s Law could be useful as an early indicator to detect the 
possibility of fraud in municipal governments’ financial data.  
 In order to investigate this question, I will analyze the financial statements of 
Jefferson County, Vallejo City, and Orange County and apply Benford’s Law to them. 
Since we know (thanks to the luxury of hindsight) that these three municipalities have 
committed fraud or outrageously mismanaged their finances, by retrospectively testing 
Benford’s Law on these municipalities’ financial data, we might be able to determine 
whether or not Benford’s Law is a good indicator of fraud and could have been used to 
provide a warning sign for regulators and investors.  
 My analysis will be done by conducting two different tests. First, I will analyze 
the financial statements from five years before filing for bankruptcy and the year of 
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filing, and apply Benford’s Law to each fiscal year, resulting in a total of eighteen tests. 
In the second test, I will compile all of the six years’ data for each municipality into one 
data set, so there are a total of three data sets, one for each municipality. If the data sets 
do not follow Benford’s distribution, I can then conclude there was possibly a 
manipulation of the data and further analysis of potential fraud would have been 
warranted. 
 Along with the economic downturn of the U.S. economy since 2008, there has 
been increasing press publicizing the dire financial conditions of various municipal 
governments. This is because from 2002 to 2008, “the states had piled up debts right 
alongside their citizens: their level of indebtedness, as a group, had almost doubled, and 
state spending had grown by two-thirds. In that time the states had also systematically 
underfunded their pension plans and other future liabilities by a total of nearly $1.5 
trillion. In response, perhaps, the pension money that they had set aside was invested in 
ever riskier assets. In 1980 only 23 percent of state pension money had been invested in 
the stock market; by 2008 the number had risen to 60 percent. To top it off, these pension 
funds were pretty much all assuming they could earn 8 percent on the money they had to 
invest, at a time when the Federal Reserve was promising to keep interest rates at zero. 
Toss in underfunded health-care plans, a reduction in federal dollars available to the 
states, and the depression in tax revenues caused by a soft economy, and the states were 
looking at multi-trillion-dollar holes that could be dealt with in only one of two ways: 
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massive cutbacks in public services or a default—or both.”1 Poor management, 
irresponsible governments, inflated economic expectations, whatever the cause, there 
have been increasing calls for bankruptcy and reorganization.   
 Municipal bankruptcies weigh on both those who rely on municipal services as 
well as municipal employees. Since municipalities are legally obligated to meet the costs 
of funding pension plans, a major competent of its financial obligations, they can only 
respond to a fiscal crisis by cutting elsewhere. For example, San Jose, California, once 
run by 7,450 workers, had to reduce the number of city workers to 5,400, which is back 
to the staffing levels of 1988 when there were a quarter million fewer residents. The 
remaining workers then had to take a ten percent pay cut, yet even this was not enough to 
offset the city’s pension liabilities. Other municipal services of the city were also forced 
to cut back. The city closed its libraries three days a week and had to cut back servicing 
its parks. It also refrained from opening a brand-new community center, built before the 
housing bust, because it couldn’t pay to staff it. And on top of this, for the first time in 
history, it laid off police officers and firefighters. At that point, if not before, the city was 
nothing more than a vehicle to pay the retirement costs of its former workers.2 This is just 
one example of how municipalities’ funding of burdensome pension plans are causing 
other municipal services to suffer.  
 Municipal employees are also exposed by the financial strain pension plans are 
putting on municipalities.  Employees face the possibility of losing their jobs and health 
                                                
1 Lewis, Michael. "California and Bust." Vanity Fair. Nov. 2011. Web. 10 Apr. 2012. 
<http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/11/michael-lewis-201111>. 
2 Ibid. 
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benefits if a municipality goes bankrupt because of the financial stresses it is under. 
Employees worry they could lose the health benefits promised in retirement due to a 
municipality’s bankruptcy, and many are even afraid of getting sick because they know 
they may not have health benefits in the future. It is crucial to try to prevent 
municipalities from going bankrupt because it harms not only themselves, but also the 
people it is supposed to serve. 
 Filing for bankruptcy gives a municipality a chance to start fresh by relieving debt 
obligations and offering creditors a chance to gain some measure of repayment.  
Municipalities across the U.S. have become so financially distressed that they are seeking 
protection from creditors by filing under Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.  
According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Chapter 9 
bankruptcy is meant to “provide a financially distressed municipality protection from its 
creditors while it develops and negotiates a plan for adjusting its debts”.3  A municipality 
can adjust its debts either by “extending debt maturities, reducing the amount of principal 
or interest, or refinancing the debt by obtaining a new loan”.4   
 Although Chapter 9 is similar to other chapters, there are some significant 
differences. Chapter 9 is much like Chapter 11 bankruptcy, in that it provides the 
opportunity for reorganization, however, only municipalities such as cities, townships, 
counties, public improvement districts and school districts may file for a Chapter 9 
proceeding.  There is also no stipulation in the Law for the liquidation of the 
                                                
3 "Chapter 9." United States Courts. Web. 01 Dec. 2011. 
<http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9aspx>. 
4 Ibid. 
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municipality’s assets and distribution of the proceeds to creditors.  This is because  “such 
a liquidation or dissolution like this would violate the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution and the reservation to the states of sovereignty over their internal affairs.”5  
Also due to the severe limitations placed upon the bankruptcy court’s power in Chapter 9 
cases, it is generally not as active in managing a municipal bankruptcy case as it is in 
corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11. Some of these limitations include not 
interfering with – “(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any 
of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any 
income-producing property unless the debtor consents or the plan so provides”.6 The 
provision makes it clear that the debtor’s day-to-day activities are not subject to the 
court’s approval. The bankruptcy court’s functions include approving the petition for 
bankruptcy, confirming a plan of debt adjustment, and ensuring the plan’s 
implementation.7  
 The nationwide dramatic decline in U.S. commercial, industrial, and residential 
property values over the past three years has led to disastrous declines in tax receipts for 
most municipalities. Declining revenues have recently been a major source of 
municipality bankruptcies, although typically, the main cause is stress to the system that 
occurs from managing the expense side, whether it is undisciplined financial 
management, out of control spending without correlating revenues, or lack of 
accountability for responsible financial management.  
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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 Three municipalities of note that have captured financial headlines in recent years 
are Jefferson County, Alabama, Vallejo City, California, and Orange County, California 
because of their controversial bankruptcies. 
 The bankruptcy of Jefferson County, Alabama is an instructive model.  Jefferson 
County filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history in 2011 with $3.14 billion in debt 
because of two controversial projects which accounted for a majority of the 
municipality’s debt. The first project involved overhauling the city’s sewer system. The 
second transaction involved entering into a series of risky bond-swap agreements. Both 
deals were scrutinized in retrospect because of the widespread corruption, bribery and 
fraud charges against Jefferson County’s officials and government workers. Larry 
Langford, the former mayor of Birmingham, was sentenced to fifteen years of 
imprisonment for his role in the bribery scheme and corrupt business deals that fueled the 
multi-billion dollar sewer debt that led to Jefferson Country’s bankruptcy.8 Experts 
expect years of litigation to determine how much debt was used for the legitimate sewer 
system improvements versus enriching former county officials. Litigations include Wall 
Street bondholders who dispute the repayments and this “could have far-reaching 
implications for the $3.7 trillion municipal bond market” and investor confidence in the 
marketplace.9 
                                                
8  United States of America versus Larry P. Langford. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit. U.S. Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit. 5 Aug. 2011.United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh District. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District, 5 Aug. 2011. Web. 22 Mar. 
2012. <http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201011076.pdf>. 
9 Corkery, Michael, and Katy Stech. "Alabama Bond Fight Begins a New Round." Wall Street Journal. 16 
Apr. 2012. Web. 19 Apr. 2012. 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303624004577340312976464358.html?mod=googlenew
s_wsj>. 
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 Another model is Orange County, California, which filed for the second largest 
municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history in 1994. The county treasurer, Bob Citron, gambled 
with public funds by investing in risky Wall Street securities. In the beginning of 1994, 
the Orange County investment pool had about $7.6 billion in deposits.  Citron then 
borrowed $2 for every $1 on deposit and increased the size of the investment pool to 
$20.6 billion.10  In essence, he was “borrowing short to go long and investing the dollars 
in exotic securities whose yields were inversely related to interest rates. Unfortunately, 
also during 1994, the Federal Reserve Board began and kept on raising interest rates, and 
Citron kept buying in the hope they would decline.”11  Almost no one was paying 
attention to what the treasurer was doing and even fewer understood it. It wasn’t until 
November of 1994 when the auditors informed the Board of Supervisors that Citron had 
lost nearly $1.7 billion.12  
 Vallejo City filed for bankruptcy in 2008, becoming the largest municipality ever 
to do so in California. The primary reason for the municipality’s financial turmoil was 
due to the municipality’s labor contracts.13  Stephanie Gones, Vallejo City 
Councilwoman, blamed the bankruptcy largely on the inflated salaries and benefits for 
                                                
10 "The Orange County Bankruptcy: Who's Next?" Research Brief 11 (1998). PPIC. The Public Policy 
Institute of California, Apr. 1998. Web. 22 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_498MBRB.pdf>. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Jones, Carolyn. "Vallejo Votes to Declare Chapter 9 Bankruptcy." SFGate. San Francisco Chronicle, 7 
May 2008. Web. 3 Apr. 2012. 
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/05/06/BACH10HUK6.DTL>. 
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Vallejo firefighters and police officers.14  In Vallejo, the public safety employees were 
some of the highest paid in the San Francisco Bay Area. The municipality spent about 
“74% of its $80 million general fund budget on public safety salaries, which is 
significantly higher than the state average”.15 This was a result of the generous contracts 
from deals made in the 1970s following police strikes.  While officials wanted to file for 
bankruptcy, “police, fire and other unions…were outraged” and “accused the council of 
poor leadership”.16  Following bankruptcy, the unions challenged Vallejo’s solvency, 
questioning whether they were hiding money, demanded they pay them from restricted 
funds, and ultimately fought them on whether they could tear up their CBAs (collective 
bargaining agreements)”.17 The municipality’s bankruptcy was caused by a major 
mismanagement of funds, and the employees and taxpayers whose services have been 
reduced are paying the price.   
 Since municipal bankruptcies have such severe repercussions on the lives of the 
taxpayers, municipal employees, and the entire bond market, it’s important to try to 
prevent them. Municipal bankruptcies, like the ones above, could have been prevented. 
One method of prevention is to have better oversight and accountability over the use of 
funds. The Board of Supervisors or City Council could more actively supervise the 
                                                
14 "Re: Speech before the Contra Costa Taxpayers Association." Web log 
comment.Http://www.stephaniegomes.com/. 24 June 2011. Web. 3 Apr. 2012. 
<http://www.stephaniegomes.com/2011/06/speech-to-contra-costa-taxpayers.html>. 
15 Jones, Carolyn. "Vallejo Votes to Declare Chapter 9 Bankruptcy." SFGate. San Francisco Cronicle, 7 
May 2008. Web. 3 Apr. 2012. <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/05/06/BACH10HUK6.DTL>. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Nessi, Ted. "A Vallejo Councilwoman Warns Central Falls about Chapter 9." Web log post. WPRI 
Eyewitness News. WPRI, 15 Aug. 2011. Web. 3 Apr. 2012. <http://blogs.wpri.com/2011/08/15/a-vallejo-
councilwoman-warns-central-falls-about-chapter-9/>. 
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municipality’s investment decisions and business transactions. Another method would be 
for state governments to monitor the fiscal condition of its local governments more 
closely instead of waiting for problems to become more serious or catastrophic. The 
state’s controller could analyze which counties show signs of distress and address the 
issue before it reaches a critical level.18  
 A method the over sight bodies and auditors could apply is a theory called 
Benford’s Law, which can detect fraud in financial statements.  Financial reporting fraud 
occurs when a company, government agency, or other organization, intentionally 
misstates or omits information from its financial statements. Many articles and research 
have promoted the use of Benford’s Law as a tool for auditors to uncover fraud in 
financial statements. This law could have been applied to these three municipalities as a 
method of early detection within each municipality and possibly could have caught the 
financial problems early enough to prevent their eventual bankruptcies. 
 I find below that if Benford’s Law had been applied to the financial statements of 
all three municipalities, it would have given warning that something was amiss. It will 
also help promote Benford’s Law in providing auditors with a tool that is effective in 
detecting fraud. 
 Background and an overview of relevant research and papers about Benford’s 
Law and applying it to financial statements can be found in section II. In section III, my 
methodology and data are explained and in section IV, my results. Section V and VI 
                                                
18 "The Orange County Bankruptcy: Who's Next?" Research Brief 11 (1998). PPIC. The Public Policy 
Institute of California, Apr. 1998. Web. 22 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_498MBRB.pdf>. 
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include my discussion and conclusion.  And finally, all the tables are found in the 
appendix. 
II. Benford’s Law 
 
 In 1881, Simon Newcomb published an article, Note on the Frequency of Use of 
the Different Digits in Natural Numbers, describing what has become known as 
Benford’s Law. He noticed in the library’s logarithmic books, the beginning pages with 
lower digits were more worn out than the pages with higher digits. He concluded from 
this pattern that “the ten digits do not occur with an equal frequency” and the “first 
significant figure is oftener 1 than any other digit, and the frequency diminishes up to 
9”.19  The conclusion was that more numbers begin with the digit 1 than with larger 
numbers like 9. 
 In 1938, Frank Benford, published The Law of Anomalous Numbers, which 
describes his findings, now referred to as Benford’s Law. Benford, like Newcomb, also 
observed in logarithmic books that the first pages showed more wear than the last pages, 
indicating that the more numbers begin with the digit 1 than the digit 9. He then 
empirically tested the first digit frequencies of about 20,000 numbers from a wide variety 
of sources, like areas of rivers, death rates, and atomic weights of elements.20 His results 
showed that an average of 30.6% of the numbers had the leading digit 1, while in 
contrast, only 4.7% of the numbers had the first digit 9. From this, Benford then 
hypothesized that naturally occurring data should form a geometric sequence. Through 
                                                
19 Newcomb, Simon. "Note on the Frequency of Use of the Different Digits in Natural Numbers." American 
Journal of Mathematics 4.1 (1881): 39-40. JSTOR. Web. 27 Feb. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/>. 
20 Benford, Frank. "The Law of Anomalous Numbers." The American Philosophical Society 78.4 (1938): 
551-72. JSTOR. Web. 4 Dec. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
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calculus, he formulated the expected frequencies for the first and second digits in 
numbers as well as the two digit combinations of the first and second digits. The formulas 
using base 10 logarithms are as follows, where P is the probability of observing the event 
in parentheses, D1 is the first digit of a number, D2 is the second digit of the same 
number, and d1 and d2 denote the possible digits, 0 through 9. 
 
 P(D1 = d1) = log (1+1/d1) 
  d1 ∈ {1,2…9} 
 
           9 
 P(D2 = d2) = ∑  log (1+ (1/d1d2)) 
          d1=1  
  d2 ∈ {0,1…9} 
 
 P(D1D2 = d1d2) = log (1+1/d1d2)) 
  d1d2 ∈ {10,11…99} 
 
 Table 1 in the appendix shows the expected digital frequencies under Benford’s 
Law (and the above formulas) for all digits 0 through 9 in the first two places in a 
number. The digit 1 has the highest expected frequency of 30.1%, while the expected 
frequency of the digit 9 is just 4.6%. The second digits are less skewed than the first, as 
seen in Table 1. The expected frequencies of first and second digit combinations can be 
found by using the above formula, where for example,  
 P(D1D2 = 99)  
  = log (1+(1/99)) ≈ 0.44% 
 
Benford’s Law is an empirically observable phenomenon and applies to many data sets 
like lists of numbers, populations of cities, market values, and net incomes.
 Benford’s Law has also been used in empirical studies as a way to help determine 
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a data set’s lack of authenticity.  If a data set does not conform to Benford’s distribution, 
then the data has likely been manipulated. Following this idea, many have applied 
Benford’s Law in accounting as a way of detecting fraud.  
 The first accounting application of Benford’s Law was in a study done by 
Carslaw (1988). He observed that earnings numbers from New Zealand firms departed 
significantly from expectations. According to Benford’s distribution, the earnings 
numbers contained a higher frequency of zeros in the second digit position than expected, 
and fewer nines.21 This implied, for example, that when a firm had earnings such as 
1,900,000 they rounded up to 2,000,000. 
 Thomas (1989) was inspired by Carslaw’s work and decided to conduct a study to 
see if reported earnings for U.S. firms followed similar patterns as New Zealand firms.  
He discovered there was a similar pattern in the earnings of U.S. firms. However, U.S. 
firms’ numbers deviated less from expectations than New Zealand firms, and reflected an 
opposite pattern, in that there were fewer zeros and more nines than expected. The results 
show that managers of U.S. firms that reported losses avoid round numbers. Therefore, 
for example, they would round 2,000,000 down to 1,900,000.22  
 Nigrini (1996) is one of the first researchers to apply Benford’s Law extensively 
in an accounting context with the goal of detecting fraud. His dissertation used digital 
analysis to help identify tax evaders. His research indicated that low-income taxpayers 
practiced unplanned tax evasion to a greater extent than high-income taxpayers. 
                                                
21 Carslaw, Charles A.P.N. "Anomolies in Income Numbers: Evidence of Goal Oriented  Behavior." The 
Accounting Review LXIII.2 (1988): 321-27. JSTOR. Web. 5 Dec. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
22 Thomas, Jacob K. "Unusual Patterns in Reported Earnings." The Accounting Review LXIV.4 (1989): 
773-87. JSTOR. Web. 5 Dec. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
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Unplanned tax evasion is a blatant manipulation by the taxpayer at filing time by 
inventing numbers for line items. High-income taxpayers practiced unplanned tax 
evasion by understating income items and overstating deduction items.23  
 Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997) did another study examining accounting data for 
their conformity to the digital frequencies to Benford’s Law. They concluded that 
auditors could test the authenticity of lists of numbers by comparing the actual and 
expected digital frequencies.24 
 However, there is some academic literature that is cautious about promoting the 
effectiveness of Benford’s Law in detecting fraud. In particular, such work, like one by 
Etteridge and Srivastava (1999), cautions that a data set which, when tested, does not 
conform to Benford’s Law, may only show operating inefficiencies or flaws in 
accounting and reporting systems rather than fraud.25 
 In Durtschi, Hillison and Pacini (2004), the authors expand on the findings of 
Etteridge and Srivastava by discussing why certain data sets are appropriate for digital 
analysis and others not. They explain the effective use of Benford’s Law in assisting in 
the detection of fraud in accounting data by specifically identifying which data sets can 
be expected to follow Benford’s Law and the types of fraud that can be detected. The 
types of data sets that can be used are sets of numbers that result from the mathematical 
combination of numbers. For example, accounts payable, which is a combination of the 
                                                
23 Nigrini, Mark J. "A Taxpayer Compliance Application of Benford's Law." Jata 18.1 (1996): 72-
91. EBSCOhost. Web. 5 Dec. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com/>. 
24 Nigrini, Mark J. "The Use of Benford's Law as an Aid in Analytical  Procedures." Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory16.2 (1997): 52-67. Web.  5 Dec. 2011. <fabweb.cityu.edu>. 
25 Michael L. Ettredge and Rajendra P. Srivastava (1999) Using Digital Analysis to Enhance Data Integrity. 
Issues in Accounting Education: November 1999, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 675-690. 
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number of items bought multiplied by the price.  On the other hand, Benford analysis 
would not be useful on data sets comprised of assigned numbers, like check numbers or 
invoice numbers.  The authors also address potential problems that may arise, 
specifically, “Benford analysis should only be applied to accounts which conform to the 
Benford distribution, and the auditor must be cognizant of the fact that certain types of 
fraud will not be found with this analysis”.26 Nevertheless, Durtschi, Hillison, and Pacini 
demonstrate in their paper that when Benford’s Law is used correctly, it is proves to be 
successful in identifying fraud in a population of accounting data sets. 
 In Benford's Law: Applications for Forensic Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud 
Detection, Nigrini illustrates other limitations of the application of Benford’s Law.  One 
limitation is that a data set can conform to Benford’s Law and still contain some fraud or 
errors. The problem is that “when many data points are combined in one data table, the 
data can still contain fraud and errors, and these will be overwhelmed by the rest of the 
data. A controller needs to overstate only one number to overstate income.”27 Changing 
one number, however, will not cause non-conformity to Benford’s Law. Fraud in just one 
unit is difficult to detect by just using Benford’s Law. Therefore, Benford’s Law is very 
useful in detecting macro issues in a data table, like multiple campaign donations to a 
single candidate that are at the limit allowed by the law. 
                                                
26 Durtschi, Cindy, William Hillison, and Carl Pacini. "The Effective Use of Benford's Law to Assist in 
Detective Fraud in Accounting Data." V.1524-5586 (2004): 17-34. UIC. Journal of Forensic Accounting. 
Web. 4 Dec. 2011. <http://www.uic.edu/>. 
27 Nigrini, Mark J. "Fraudulent Financial Statements, Part II." Benford's Law: Applications for Forensic 
Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012. 214. Print. 
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  Another major limitation Nigrini explains is that there might be too few numbers 
in a set of financial statements to accurately detect fraud using Benford’s Law. Detecting 
fraud “would be easy if we could simply compare the patterns of a single set of financial 
statements to Benford’s Law and then conclude that nonconformity means that the 
financial statements are misstated. This would make Benford’s Law similar to a lie 
detector test. Unfortunately, fraudulent financial statements are rarely identified only by 
analyzing the numbers of financial statements.”28 This is because there are simply too 
few numbers in a set of financial statements for Benford’s Law to accurately signal fraud 
or irregularities. Because there are “just a few hundred numbers, any set of financial 
statements could deviate substantially from Benford’s Law [merely by chance].”29 
Benford’s distribution might not be a valid expectation for small data sets. For example, 
the IRS could then run Benford’s Law on all of the millions of income tax returns 
submitted in a particular year and expect the numbers to conform to Benford’s 
distribution. However, since there are only a “few numbers on an individual tax return, 
the return when analyzed could have a large deviation from Benford’s Law and still be 
accurate and compliant”.30 Although Benford’s Law might not accurately prove there is 
fraud, it can still be an indicator of the possibility of fraud. Nonconformity to Benford’s 
Law is an indicator of possible irregularities and therefore directs an auditor’s attention to 
the financial statements that merit further attention. 
                                                
28 Nigrini, Mark J. "Fraudulent Financial Statements, Part II." Benford's Law: Applications for Forensic 
Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012. 215. Print. 
29 Nigrini, Mark J. "Fraudulent Financial Statements, Part II." Benford's Law: Applications for Forensic 
Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012. 221. Print. 
30 Ibid. 
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 Although Benford’s Law has its limitations, it is legally admissible in U.S. 
criminal cases at the federal, state, local levels, and even internationally. For example, it 
was invoked as evidence of fraud in the 2009 Iranian elections. Boudewjin Roukema in 
Benford’s Law Anomalies in the 2009 Iranian Presidential Election (2009) used 
Benford’s Law to test the results from the Iranian election. Roukema noticed a strange 
anomaly in the votes for Mehdi Karroubi, who came in third place; he found that the 
number 7 occurred as a first digit more often than would be expected in Benford’s Law.31 
He then discovered that this anomaly also occurred in three of the six largest voting areas, 
and that the winner, Mahoud Ahmedinejad, had a greater portion of the votes in those 
three areas than the others. Roukema thus concluded there was an error in the official 
count of votes. 
 Benford’s Law is also one of the techniques used within the accounting profession 
to detect the possibility of fraud. In Saville’s Using Benford's Law to Detect Data Error 
and Fraud: An Examination of Companies Listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(2006), his goal is to explore the relevance of Benford’s Law in the detection of 
anomalies in data in companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. He 
concludes that although Benford’s Law has limitations, his findings suggest that 
Benford’s Law still has the capacity to play a helpful role in assisting users of accounting 
data to detect error or fraud in financial information. He found all 17 of the ‘errant’ 
companies failed the test and only 3 of the ‘compliant’ companies failed the test, giving 
                                                
31 Roukema, Bouewjin. "Benford’s Law Anomalies in the 2009 Iranian Presidential Election." Annals of 
Applied Statistics (2009): 1-14. Annals of Supplied Statistics, 16 June 2000. Web. 4 Apr. 2012. 
<http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0906/0906.2789v1.pdf>. 
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the accuracy rate of 88.8%.32 His final paragraph notes: “Benford’s Law has the capacity 
to serve as an effective indicator of data problems in accounting information” and also 
“Benford’s Law has the potential to act as a highly effective detector of data error of 
fraud in accounting information”.33 
 In addition to this, the Big 4 accounting firms use Benford’s Law to conform to 
the fraud detection recommendations of the Statement of Auditing Standards No. 99. This 
statement requires accounting firms to assess the possibility of material misstatement as it 
relates to fraud in the audit of financial statements. Accounting firms’ computer-assisted 
audit tools, like IDEA and ACL, have a command for Benford’s Law enabling them to 
use Benford’s Law as an initial “smell test”.  Although analytic methods by using 
Benford’s Law alone usually cannot detect fraudulent financial reporting, deviations from 
Benford’s Law should “cause an analyst to question the validity, accuracy, or the 
completeness of numbers”.34 Therefore, Benford’s Law can still be an appropriate 
method to detect the possibility of fraud. The purpose of this paper is to examine if 
Benford’s Law may be useful as an early indicator to detect the possibility of fraud in 
municipal governments’ financial data. I find that Benford’s Law, had it been applied in 
real time to Jefferson County, Vallejo City, and Orange County’s financial statements, 
                                                
32 Saville, AD. "Using Benford's Law to Detect Data Error and Fraud: An Examination of Companies 
Listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange." SAJEMS 9.3 (2006): 341-54. Scribd. Scribd. Web. 4 Apr. 
2012. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/47789223/Saville-Using-282006-29>. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Nigrini, Mark J. "Fraudulent Financial Statements, Part II." Benford's Law: Applications for Forensic 
Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012. 213. Print. 
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would have been able to detect that something was amiss and further investigation was 
warranted. 
III. Methods 
 I first obtained the annual financial statements for Jefferson County, Vallejo City, 
and Orange County. For each municipality, this included each of the five years before 
filing for bankruptcy and the year of filling. The first test was done by applying 
Benford’s Law to each of the six annual financial statements for each municipality, which 
resulted in eighteen statements total.  For the second test, all six years’ of data were 
compiled for each municipality, which created three sets of data for analysis, one for each 
municipality.  For Jefferson County, I examined the annual financial statements for 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010; Vallejo City 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008; 
and Orange County 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. 
 The financial statement numbers were analyzed by applying the following rules 
which are based on Nigrini’s rules in Benford’s Law: Applications for Forensic 
Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection: 
1. The numbers were analyzed from the municipalities’ Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports (CAFR). This included from the financial statements the 
statement of net assets, statement of activities, and the balance sheet. 
2. In the first test, the numbers analyzed were only those for each fiscal year, while 
in the second test, the numbers included all six years compiled. 
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3. Numbers such as page numbers, dates, the number of notes, numbers in product 
descriptions (e.g., Concerta 18 or 87 octane fuel), and other general references to 
time (e.g., depreciation over 10 years or 90-day notes) were omitted.35 
4. Numbers that are subtotaled or totals that do not convey any new information 
were omitted.  For example, subtotals such as total current assets or total current 
liabilities were omitted. Since these subtotals and totals do not reflect any new 
information, they cannot be manipulated because they are the sums or differences 
between items.36 
5. Also omitted were obvious duplications of information. For example, the 
statement of net assets usually includes cash and cash investments and these 
numbers are also reported on the balance sheet. These numbers on the balance 
sheet are omitted because they do not convey any new information.37 
6. Zeros were omitted because zero is not a number with analyzable digits.38 
7. Negative numbers were analyzed as if they were positive numbers.39 
 The digital analysis on each data set was done using a program called 
NigriniCycle.xlsx, which is a software program in Excel created by Mark J. Nigrini. In 
Excel, the columns A, B, and C contain any descriptive data or labels for the account. All 
of the data was entered into Column D. The spreadsheet analyzed the data from column 
D and generated Column E with the first digit of the number, column F with the second 
                                                
35 Nigrini, Mark J. "Fraudulent Financial Statements, Part II." Benford's Law: Applications for Forensic 
Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012. 218-219. Print. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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digit, and column G with the first-two digits. The spreadsheet then automatically 
generated the digit tests with graphs that compared the actual frequency to the expected 
frequency from Benford’s Law.  
 The three digit tests consisted of (a) first digits, (b) second digits, and (c) the first-
two digits. The first-digit test was an overall test of the reasonableness of the data. The 
general rule is that if the first digit test was a weak fit to Benford’s Law, it was a signal 
the data set contained abnormal duplications and anomalies. Therefore, the first digit test 
was a predictor test in that it was the first indicator of data issues. If there was a weak fit 
in the second digit test, it indicated issues with rounding numbers, such as an excess of 0s 
or 5s due to rounding numbers to 75, 100, and so on. The first-two digit test was the test 
that highlighted possible bias in the data. For example, if a company was analyzing 
company expenses, and there was a spike in the number 24, it could indicate that at a firm 
where employees are required to submit vouchers for expenses that are $25 and higher, 
people are submitting more expenses for $24 than in reality.40 
In order to assess each digit test’s conformity to Benford’s Law, a test called the 
mean absolute deviation (MAD) was used. The formula is as follows: 
       K      
     Σi=1 |AP – EP| 
 Mean Absolute Deviation =  ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯, 
      K 
 
where K represents the number of digits,  AP denotes the actual proportion of the number 
of times a particular digit occurs within the data, and EP is the expected proportion 
                                                
40 Nigrini, Mark J. Datas 2009 for Excel 2007 Program Details. Web. 
<http://www.nigrini.com/datas_software.htm> 
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according to Benford’s Law. Here, a “digit” may refer to a first-two-digit combination; so 
a “digit” may refer not only to any of the single digits from 1 to 9 but also to a two-digit 
number like 78, even though 78 is a first-two-digit combination.  The deviation in the 
numerator measured the difference between the actual proportion and the expected 
proportion for each digit. For example, if there was an actual proportion of 0.0412 and an 
expected proportion of 0.0414 for the number 10, the deviation was the difference 
between the two numbers, which was -0.0002. The absolute symbol means that the 
deviation was given a positive sign irrespective of whether it was positive or negative. 
The summation sign in the numerator summed up the deviations from all the accounts 
and the denominator denoted dividing the summation by the total number of digits in the 
data set. This then equated to the mean absolute deviation.41 
 The MAD was the answer to whether or not the data set conformed to Benford’s 
Law and to what extent it did or did not. The higher the MAD, the larger the average 
difference between the actual and expected proportions.  Drake and Nigrini (2000) 
developed guidelines based on personal experience with testing everyday data tables with 
Benford’s Law. Table 2 shows the MAD critical value ranges for the first, second, and 
first-two digits.42 The NigriniCycle.xlsx template calculated the MAD in column N. 
 Although the MAD showed whether the data followed Benford’s distribution, the 
Z-statistic test analyzed whether the actual proportion for a digit statistically differed 
from the expected proportion from Benford’s Law. Again here, a digit also refers to not 
                                                
41 Nigrini, Mark J. "Fraudulent Financial Statements, Part II." Benford's Law: Applications for Forensic 
Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012. 158-160. Print. 
42 Ibid. 
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only 1 or 9, but also to two-digit combinations such as 45. The Z-statistic formula 
measured the absolute magnitude of the difference between the actual and expected 
proportions, the size of the data set, and the expected proportion. The formula is: 
  |AP – EP| - (1/2N) 
 Z =  ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯  
      EP(1-EP)   
         ⎯⎯⎯⎯     
  √ N 
where AP denotes the actual proportion of the digit, EP the expected proportion 
according to Benford’s Law, and N the number of digits. The last term in the numerator 
(1/2N) is a continuity correction term and was only used when it was smaller than the 
first term in the numerator, but this had little impact on the calculated Z-statistic.  
 As the difference between the actual proportion, AP, and the expected proportion, 
EP, gets larger, the Z-statistic becomes larger. For example, if there was a spike in the 
data set at 32, this means there was a difference between the expected proportion of 
0.0134 and actual proportion of 0.0152. “The size of the spike is then 0.0019 (rounded). 
If, for example, there were 19,2482 records greater than or equal to 10 in the data set, the 
Z-statistic is calculated to be 2.260. For a significance level of 5 percent, the cutoff level 
is 1.96. Our calculated Z of 2.260 exceeds this cutoff level, leading us to conclude that 
the actual proportion differs significantly from the expected proportion. For a 1 percent 
significance level, our cutoff score would be 2.57, and for this case, the calculated Z is 
not significant at the 1 percent level. The significance level is calculated by using Excel’s 
NORMSDIST function. The result of NORMSDIST (2.260) is 0.988. The significance 
level is calculated by: 
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 Significance = 2 x (1- NORMDIST(x)) 
 
 
 A NORMDIST result of 0.988 gives a significance level of 0.024. Therefore, the 
result is significant at the 5 percent and the 2.4 percent level, but not significant at the 1 
percent level.”43 
 The effect of N in the denominator is that as the data set gets larger, the Z-statistic 
for any spike becomes larger. This means that a larger spike for a smaller data set might 
not be significant, and a smaller spike for a larger data set might be significant. For 
example, the “spike of 0.0019 becomes more significant as the data increases in size. 
Using the same actual proportion, if the data had 100,000 records, the calculated Z-
statistic would be 5.178. With a fivefold increase in the number of records, the Z-statistic 
would only double in size because N is inside the square root sign.”44 
 The EP, the expected proportion, is used twice in the denominator because for 
any given difference, a smaller expected proportion gives a larger Z-statistic. “In the 
preceding example, there is a 0.19 percent difference (0.0152-0.0134).  If the expected 
proportion was (say) 5.0 percent and the actual was 5.19 percent, we would still have a 
0.19 percent difference but the Z-statistic would be lower and insignificant at 1.200. This 
is logical because the 0.19 percent difference is a bigger difference for an expected 
percentage of 1.34 percent than it is for an expected percentage of 5.00 percent. The 
general rule is that a difference is more significant for the higher digits (which have lower 
                                                
43 Nigrini, Mark J. "Fraudulent Financial Statements, Part II." Benford's Law: Applications for Forensic 
Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012. 150. Online. 
44 Ibid. 
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expected proportions) than for the lower digits (which have higher expected 
proportions).”45 
 The Z-statistic tells us whether the actual proportion for a digit deviates 
significantly (in the statistical sense of the word) from the expected proportion. For 
Benford’s Law, a significance level of 5 percent was used. This means if there was a Z-
statistic for a digit of 1.96 or higher, it was significant. The NigriniCycle.xlsx template 
calculated the Z-statistic in column G for the first and second digits test and column 0 for 
the first-two digits test.   
 The MAD test concluded whether or not the data set overall conformed to 
Benford’s Law, while the Z-statistic measured whether a specific digits’ deviation was 
significant. If the data did not conform to Benford’s Law according to the MAD, then, I 
could infer the municipality was possibly manipulating its data, and could then conclude 
where the manipulation was occurring according to the Z-statistic.  Further investigation 
could then be focused.  
IV. Results 
 My analysis was be done by conducting two different tests for each municipality. 
For the first test, I analyzed the financial statements from five years before filing for 
bankruptcy and the year of filing, and applied Benford’s Law to each fiscal year. In the 
second test, all of the six years of data were aggregated into one data set. If the data sets 
do not follow Benford’s distribution, I can then conclude there was possibly a 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
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manipulation of the data and further analysis of potential fraud would have been 
warranted. 
A. Jefferson County 
 1. First tests   
 The first digits for Jefferson County’s 2005 annual financial data show that the 
accounting data does not conform to Benford’s Law. The mean absolute deviation 
(MAD) is 0.05687, which exceeds the 0.015 critical value for nonconformity by a wide 
margin. Figure 1 shows the difference in the actual proportions and the expected 
proportion of first digits from Benford’s Law. The bars represent the actual proportions 
of the digits and the line represents the expected proportions. Since there is overall 
nonconformity to Benford’s Law in the first digit test, this signals the data set may have 
abnormal duplications and anomalies.  However, none of the first digits have a Z-statistic 
higher like 1.96, meaning the individual differences in the actual and expected 
frequencies are not significant. 
 The second digits also show nonconformity to Benford’s Law. The MAD of 
0.06656 exceeds the critical value of 0.012 for overall nonconformity. Figure 2 shows the 
proportions of all the digits’ deviation from Benford’s Law. However, according to the Z-
statistics, the digit 0 is the only one that deviates significantly. It has a Z-statistic of 
2.162, which is above the 1.96 threshold for 5% conformity. This implies that there were 
issues within the data set like rounding numbers. 
 The first-two digits show nonconformity to Benford’s Law because it has an 
MAD of 0.01713, which exceeds the critical level of 0.0022. The second order results in 
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Figure 3 show large spikes throughout the data set at many different first-two digits. 
According to the Z-statistics, the significant differences are at the digit 20, with a Z-
statistic of 2.736, and 60, with a Z-statistic of 3.126.  The accounting data then indicates 
fraud is possibly occurring and a closer look is warranted.  
 Jefferson County’s 2006 annual financial data also shows an overall 
nonconformity to Benford’s Law.  The first digits do not conform to Benford’s Law with 
an MAD of 0.04186. Figure 4 shows the differences between the expected and actual 
frequencies of the first digits. The actual frequency of the digit 5 significantly differs 
from the expected frequency because of the Z-statistic of 2.174. The second digits also 
show nonconformity with an MAD of 0.05350. In Figure 5, how the actual frequencies of 
the second digits differ from the expected frequencies is shown. However, none of them 
differ significantly because they all have Z-statistics lower that 1.96. With an MAD of 
0.01289, the first-two digits also do not conform to Benford’s Law. Figure 6 shows 
spikes throughout the data first-two digits data. There is significant deviation at the digits 
80 and 95 because of their Z-statistics of 2.918 and 3.254. Like the results from 2005, 
Jefferson County’s 2006 results indicate there is a possibility of fraud occurring in the 
data and a further look is indicated. 
 For Jefferson County’s 2007 annual financial data, the first digits do not conform 
to Benford’s Law with an MAD of 0.07533. The digits 3 and 8 actual frequencies 
significantly differ from their expected frequencies, with Z-statistics of 2.042 and 2.017 
respectively. The second digits also show nonconformity with an MAD of 0.06335. The 
difference between the actual and expected frequencies of the digit 4 is significant with a 
  31       
 
 
 
Z-statistic of 1.992. The differences in frequencies are shown in Figures 7 and 8. The 
first-two digits have an MAD of 0.01611, which also demonstrates nonconformity to 
Benford’s Law. Figure 9 shows the fist-two digits all occur more often than expected. 
However, the significant differences occur at the digits 34, 39, and 84, with a Z-statistics 
of 2.126, 2.350, and 3.836. The evidence from the years of 2005, 2006 and 2007 show a 
trend that Jefferson County may have been practicing fraud.  
 The annual financial accounting data for Jefferson County in 2008 also illustrates 
nonconformity to Benford’s Law. The first digits have an MAD of 0.04090, the second 
digits an MAD of 0.03801, and the first-two digits, an MAD of 0.01464. However, none 
of the digits in all three tests have significant differences between their actual and 
expected frequencies. Figure 10, 11, and 12 show the overall data differences in the 
actual and expected frequencies of the digits.  There was a trend of increasing disparity 
from the years 2005 to 2007, followed by a year of no specific disparity in 2008. 
 The first digits, second digits, and first-two digits for Jefferson County’s 2009 
annual financial data demonstrate overall nonconformity to Benford’s Law with MADs 
of 0.04646, 0.04701, and 0.01376 respectively.  As seen in Figure 13 and 14, the first 
digits and second digits do not conform to Benford’s distribution. However, none of the 
digits’ frequency differences are significant with Z-statistics lower than 1.96. Figure 15 
shows the occurrences of all the first-two digits, with spikes at 13, 33, and 55. However, 
only the digits 33 and 55 are significant with Z-statistics of 2.079 and 2.961,  
 The 2010 annual financial data for Jefferson County also implies there is the 
possibility of data manipulation. The MAD for the first digits is 0.03482, which is excess 
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of the 0.015 critical value for nonconformity, as seen in Figure 16. The second digits also 
do not conform to Benford’s Law with an MAD of 0.04930. As seen in Figure 17, the 
digit 0 differs significantly with a Z-statistic of 2.162, which indicates that rounding was 
occurring. The first-two digits have an MAD of 0.01446, which is also in excess of the 
critical value of 0.0022 for nonconformity. In Figure 18, there are spikes at every first-
two digits combination, however none of them are statistically significant.  
 For each of the annual financial statements for Jefferson County, there has been 
ongoing overall nonconformity to Benford’s Law implicating there is a possibility of 
fraud and a closer review is necessary. 
 2. Second Test 
  To apply the second test, the annual financial annual data from 2005-2010 for 
Jefferson County were compiled. The first digits have an MAD of 0.05687. Figure 19 
shows this is because there are very few occurrences of the digit 1 and over occurrences 
of the digit 8. However, neither of these are significant with Z-statistics of 1.755 and 
1.109, which is lower that the 1.96 significance level. The MAD of 0.06656 for the 
second digits is warranted because of the excess frequency of the 0 digit and the lack of 
the 1, 5 and 7 digits, as seen in Figure 20. The digit 0 is the only digit that differs 
significantly with a Z-statistic of 2.162. As seen in Figure 21, the fist-two digits have an 
MAD of 0.01713 because of the spikes at all digit combinations. This is especially 
because of the digits 20 and 60 have Z-statistics of 2.736 and 3.128. This implies that 
Jefferson County manipulated their financial data and if the accountants had known, then 
should have done further analytical tests. 
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B. Vallejo City  
 1. First Tests 
 The results from the tests of the annual financial data for Vallejo City imply there 
is the possibility of fraud. For Vallejo City’s 2003 annual financial data, the first digit test 
and second digit tests have MADs of 0.05132 and 0.03881, which is above the 0.015 and 
0.012 critical values for nonconformity, respectively. Figure 22 illustrates that there are 
too many occurrences of the digit 6 in the first digit place, with a Z-statistic of 3.062. 
Figure 23 shows the differences of the actual and expected frequencies of the second 
digits, however none of the differences are significant according to their Z-statistics. The 
first-two digits test also does not have overall conformity to Benford’s Law, as seen in 
Figure 24, and exceeds the critical value of 0.0022 for nonconformity with an MAD of 
0.01479. This is because of the spikes at all the digit combinations, especially at 60, 67, 
with a Z-statistics of 3.128 and 3.350. 
 Vallejo City’s 2004 annual financial data also implies there may have been fraud.  
The first digits have an MAD of 0.05288 because of their overall nonconformity, as seen 
in Figure 25. However, none of the first digits actual frequencies significantly differ from 
the expected frequencies of Benford’s Law. As seen in Figure 26, the second digits have 
an MAD of 0.03925 because of the lack of the frequency of the digit 3 and the digit 4 
occurring too frequently. However, the digits Z-statistics are not high enough to be 
significant. The first-two digit test has a MAD of 0.01461 due to larger than expected 
frequencies of all the digit combinations, especially the digit 47, which is significant due 
to its Z-statistic of 2.672, as seen in Figure 27. 
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 The first digits test, second digits, and first-two digits tests for Vallejo City’s 2005 
annual financial data also have MADs higher than the critical value for nonconformity; 
0.05064 for the first digits, 0.04237 for the second digits, and 0.01449 for the first-two 
digits. As seen in Figure 28, this is due to the excess frequency of the digit 6 in the first 
digit place, although it is not statistically significant. Figure 29 shows that in the second 
digit place, the even digits are favored more than the odd digits with higher than expected 
frequencies of the digits 2, 4, 6, and 8. However, the differences in the actual and 
expected frequencies of each digit are not significant either. There are spikes in Figure 30 
at all of the digit combinations in the first-two digits test, but especially at 31 and 68, 
which are significant because of their Z-statistics of 1.981 and 5.900. 
 The data from Vallejo City’s 2006 annual financial data also points to the 
possibility of fraud. This is because of the first, second, and first-two MADs are higher 
than the critical values of overall nonconformity; 0.05379, 0.05465, and 0.01535, 
respectively. Figure 31 and 32 show the overall differences in the actual and expected 
frequencies of the first and second digits, although none of them are significant with 
lower than 1.96 Z-statistics. On the other hand, the first-two digits actual frequencies vary 
significantly from the expected frequencies, especially at the digits 18 and 36 with Z-
statistics of 2.527, 4.062, as seen in Figure 33. 
 The first digits test for Vallejo City’s 2007 annual financial data has an MAD of 
0.04356 and the second digits test has an MAD of 0.04408. Therefore the data does not 
conform to Benford’s Law. However, none of the digits actual and expected frequencies 
differences are significant, but are shown in Figures 34 and 35. The first-two digits have 
  35       
 
 
 
an MAD of 0.01498, which confirm an overall nonconformity, especially at the digit 31, 
which has a Z-statistic of 1.981. 
 Vallejo City’s 2008 annual financial data shows overall nonconformity with 
Benford’s Law as seen in Figure 37 and 38. The first digits test has an MAD of 0.02893 
and the second digits test, an MAD of 0.04381. Although there is overall nonconformity, 
none of the digits differ significantly according to their Z-statistics. The first-two digits 
test also shows nonconformity in Figure 39 with an MAD of 0.01483. This is due to the 
digits 18, 35, and 46, which are significant because of their Z-statistics of 2.527, 2.173, 
and 2.633. 
 Each of the annual financial statements for 2003-2008 for Vallejo City showed 
overall nonconformity, and all according to specific digits. This indicates that there was a 
possibility of fraud and further analysis should be done on the financial statements. 
 2. Second Test  
 To conduct the second test, I compiled the data of the annual financial statements 
for 2003-2008 for Vallejo City. The first digits test has an MAD of 0.05132, which is 
above the critical value for nonconformity of 0.015. Figure 40 shows the difference 
between the actual and expected frequencies of the first digits. There is a significant 
excess frequency of the digit 6 because of its Z-statistic of 3.062, which is above the 1.96 
significance level. The second digits test has an MAD of 0.03881, which is also above the 
critical value for nonconformity of 0.012. Figure 41 shows the data’s nonconformity to 
Benford’s Law, although none of them are significant because their Z-statistics are all 
below 1.96. The first-two digits test has an MAD of 0.01479, which is in excess of the 
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0.0022 critical value for nonconformity. This is because of the digit 60 and 67 have Z-
statistics of 3.128 and 3.350, as seen in Figure 42. These are also the two digits that were 
statistically significant from Vallejo City’s 2003 annual financial data. All of the tests 
conducted on Vallejo City’s financial data point to the possibility of fraud occurring and 
a close look was necessary. 
C. Orange County  
1. First Tests 
 For the first test, each of Orange County’s annual financial data from 1989-1994 
was analyzed. For 1989, both the first and second digits tests show there is an overall 
nonconformity to Benford’s Law with MADs of 0.04998 and 0.04185. However, no 
digits’ actual frequencies deviate significantly from the expected frequencies because all 
of them Z-statistics lower than 1.96. However, the first-two digits test not only 
demonstrates overall nonconformity with an MAD of 0.01513, but significantly at the 
digit 17, with a Z-statistic of 2.416. The differences in the actual and expected 
frequencies of the first, second, and first-two digits can be found in Figures 43, 44, and 
45. 
 Orange County’s 1990 annual financial data also illustrates overall nonconformity 
to Benford’s Law. The first and second digits have MADs of 0.04798 and 0.06822. 
Figure 46 and 47 show the differences between the first and second digits actual and 
expected frequencies. However, their Z-statistics demonstrate that no particular digits’ 
actual frequencies significantly differ than the expected frequencies. The first-two digits 
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test has an MAD of 0.01440 because of the excess frequency of the digit 49 with a Z-
statistic of 2.746, as seen in Figure 48. 
 The annual financial data for 1991 for Orange County is very similar to that of 
1990 because the first and second digits tests show overall nonconformity to Benford’s 
Law, as seen in Figure 49 and 50, with MADs of 0.03534 and 0.03867. However, there 
are no digits with Z-statistic high enough to be significant within the test. The first-two 
digits test has an MAD of 0.01608, which also shows there is overall nonconformity, as 
seen in Figure 51. This is especially due to the over occurrences of the digits 21 and 39 
because of their Z-statistics of 2.836 and 2.350. 
 Orange County’s 1992 annual financial data did not conform to Benford’s Law in 
the first, second, or first-two digits tests. Figure 52 shows the first digits overall 
nonconformity because of an MAD of 0.04696. However, no particular digits’ Z-statistic 
was high enough to be significant. For the second digit test, there is also nonconformity 
with a MAD of 0.05636. This is due to the excess frequency of the digit 0 with a Z-
statistic of 2.162, as seen in Figure 53. The first-two digits test has an overall 
nonconformity to Benford’s Law, as seen in Figure 54, because of its MAD of 0.01530. 
This is due to the higher than expected frequencies of the digits 34 and 89 with Z-
statistics of 2.126 and 3.994. 
 The annual financial data for 1993 also lacks conformity to Benford’s Law. The 
first digit does not have overall conformity, as seen in Figure 55, with an MAD of 
0.05217. However, no particular digit’s frequency significantly differs from expected 
because all have Z-statistics lower than 1.96. With an MAD of 0.05246, the second digit 
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test also does not conform to Benford’s distribution in Figure 56.  The digit 4’s actual 
frequency is significantly higher than expected, with a Z-statistic of 2.658. The first-two 
digits have an MAD of 0.01480 and lack conformity, as seen in Figure 57, especially 
because the digit 84 occurs more frequently than expected with a Z-statistic of 3.836.  
 Orange County’s 1994 first, second, and first-two digit test show nonconformity 
to Benford’s Law with MADs of 0.03262, 0.04300 and 0.01464, as seen in Figure 58, 59 
and 60. Although all three tests show overall nonconformity, none of the digits’ actual 
frequencies differ significantly from their expected frequencies. For the years 1989-1993, 
specific digits showed nonconformity, while for 1994, the year Orange County filed for 
bankruptcy, no specific digits raised red flags. 
 2. Second Test 
  To perform the second test, all the annual financial data for 1989-1994 was 
compiled. The first and second digits tests demonstrate nonconformity with MADs of 
0.04998 and 0.04185, which are above the critical values for nonconformity of 0.015 and 
0.012. However, none of the digits actual frequencies significantly differ from the 
expected frequencies because their Z-statistics are all lower than 1.96. The first-two digits 
test had an MAD of 0.01513, which is also above the critical value of 0.0022 for 
nonconformity, significantly the digit 17 with a Z-statistic of 2.416. 
 All of the tests for Orange County had overall nonconformity with Benford’s 
Law, and in most cases, specific digits raised red flags. There is a high likelihood that 
Orange County was committing fraud and these results warrant that further investigation 
was needed. 
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V. Discussion 
 The tests conducted on the annual financial statements of Jefferson County, 
Vallejo City and Orange County all showed overall nonconformity to Benford’s Law.   
  It is important to take note that Benford’s Law is designed to be more useful 
when applied to much large data sets. When looking at the graphs in the appendix, some 
of the obvious gaps could have been caused by the limited amount of data that was being 
used. With this sort of analysis, one wishes that one had about 10 times more data, but 
this is not possible because financial statements inherently do not provide a robust set of 
data. However, one can only work with the information that is available and Benford’s 
Law is still proven to be useful in these situations. 
 The nature of statistical analysis includes the risk of false positives and false 
negatives just by random chance. This possibility applies to my tests too, in that 
violations of Benford’s Law from all the two digit combinations from 10 to 99 might 
occur by chance due to the limited nature of the data. For example, if the first-two digit 
test rejected the null for, say, 26, 48, and 68, this could occur randomly and not actually 
indicate fraud. While the data from one annual financial statement may pass or fail 
Benford’s Law, a series of data sets from the same municipality over several consecutive 
years would reduce that risk substantially. Because I did in fact use a series of years, the 
analysis is still valid and Benford’s Law is a good leading indicator. For example, 
Jefferson County showed a pattern from 2005 to 2007 of specific two-digit combinations 
that showed nonconformity and then in 2008, had a year with none. Even with that year 
of more conformity, the trend analysis would still create suspicion of fraud. It must be 
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noted that one year of conformity could also be caused by something other than a false 
negative, like a change in the personnel overseeing the accounting. 
 Because of these possible errors, we cannot and reach a firm conclusion that fraud 
actually occurred in some cases. However, we have the benefit of being able to look 
retrospectively at these situations of where we know where fraud existed. If a 
professional had reviewed the financial statements using Benford’s Law, there would 
have been at least a strong inference of fraud and that would compel that profession to 
investigate further and possibly where to investigate. Even that has value.  
VI. Conclusion 
 This thesis explored if fraud or mismanagement in municipal governments could 
have been diagnosed or detected in advance of their bankruptcies by financial statement 
analysis using Benford’s Law. The annual financial data for Jefferson County, Vallejo 
City, and Orange County were analyzed because we know these three municipalities 
committed fraud or grossly mismanaged their finances.  By conducting two different 
tests, I was able to determine that the data did not conform to Benford’s distribution, and 
therefore it had possibly been manipulated and a closer look at the financial statements 
was necessary. Benford’s Law therefore can be useful as an early indicator to detect the 
possibility of fraud in municipal governments’ financial data. It could have even been 
used as a warning sign to have prevented these bankruptcies.  
 Although Benford’s Law wasn’t used to prevent these bankruptcies, it can still be 
used in resolving disputes in the aftermath of the bankruptcies. For example, the current 
litigation in bankruptcy court between the bondholders and other constituents in Jefferson 
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County over the available capital, could be assisted by using Benford’s Law. It is likely 
that evidence of financial fraud could tip the balance between those parties in that 
litigation. Additionally, Benford’s Law might be able to be applied now to mitigate 
bankruptcies and decrease the amount damage of them. With the increasing rate of 
municipalities going bankrupt, Benford’s Law can be a very valuable tool for the 
municipalities about to consider bankruptcy, and even prevent others from entering into 
it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  42       
 
 
 
Bibliography  
 
Benford, Frank. "The Law of Anomalous Numbers." The American Philosophical Society 
 78.4 (1938): 551-72. JSTOR. Web. 4 Dec. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Carslaw, Charles A.P.N. "Anomolies in Income Numbers: Evidence of Goal Oriented 
 Behavior." The Accounting Review LXIII.2 (1988): 321-27. JSTOR. Web. 5 Dec. 
 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>. 
Corkery, Michael, and Katy Stech. "Alabama Bond Fight Begins a New Round." Wall 
 Street Journal. 16 Apr. 2012. Web. 19 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023036240045773403129764643
 58.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>. 
Durtschi, Cindy, William Hillison, and Carl Pacini. "The Effective Use of Benford's Law 
 to Assist in Detective Fraud in Accounting Data." V.1524-5586 (2004): 17-
 34. UIC. Journal of Forensic Accounting. Web. 4 Dec. 2011. 
 <http://www.uic.edu/>. 
Jones, Carolyn. "Vallejo Votes to Declare Chapter 9 Bankruptcy." SFGate. San Francisco 
 Chronicle, 7 May 2008. Web. 3 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/05/06/BACH10HUK6.DT
 L>. 
Lewis, Michael. "California and Bust." Vanity Fair. Nov. 2011. Web. 10 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/11/michael-lewis-201111>. 
Nessi, Ted. "A Vallejo Councilwoman Warns Central Falls about Chapter 9." Web log 
 post. WPRI Eyewitness News. WPRI, 15 Aug. 2011. Web. 3 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://blogs.wpri.com/2011/08/15/a-vallejo-councilwoman-warns-central-falls-
 about-chapter-9/>. 
Newcomb, Simon. "Note on the Frequency of Use of the Different Digits in Natural 
 Numbers." American Journal of Mathematics 4.1 (1881): 39-40. JSTOR. Web. 27 
 Feb. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/>. 
Nigrini, Mark J. "A Taxpayer Compliance Application of Benford's Law." Jata 18.1 
 (1996): 72-91. EBSCOhost. Web. 5 Dec. 2011. <http://web.ebscohost.com/>. 
Nigrini, Mark J. Datas 2009 for Excel 2007 Program Details. Web. 
 <http://www.nigrini.com/datas_software.htm> 
Nigrini, Mark J. "Fraudulent Financial Statements, Part II." Benford's Law: Applications 
 for Forensic Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 
 2012. xiv. Print. 
Nigrini, Mark J. "The Use of Benford's Law as an Aid in Analytical 
 Procedures." Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory16.2 (1997): 52-67. Web. 
 5 Dec. 2011. <fabweb.cityu.edu>. 
Michael L. Ettredge and Rajendra P. Srivastava (1999) Using Digital Analysis to 
 Enhance Data Integrity. Issues in Accounting Education: November 1999, Vol. 
 14, No. 4, pp. 675-690. 
Roukema, Bouewjin. "Benford’s Law Anomalies in the 2009 Iranian Presidential 
 Election." Annals of Applied Statistics (2009): 1-14. Annals of Supplied Statistics, 
  43       
 
 
 
 16 June 2000. Web. 4 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0906/0906.2789v1.pdf>. 
Saville, AD. "Using Benford's Law to Detect Data Error and Fraud: An Examination of 
 Companies Listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange." SAJEMS 9.3 (2006): 
 341-54. Scribd. Scribd. Web. 4 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://www.scribd.com/doc/47789223/Saville-Using-282006-29>. 
Thomas, Jacob K. "Unusual Patterns in Reported Earnings." The Accounting 
 Review LXIV.4 (1989): 773-87. JSTOR. Web. 5 Dec. 2011. 
 <http://www.jstor.org>. 
"Chapter 9." United States Courts. Web. 01 Dec. 2011. 
 <http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9
 aspx>. 
"Re: Speech before the Contra Costa Taxpayers Association." Web log 
 comment.Http://www.stephaniegomes.com/. 24 June 2011. Web. 3 Apr. 2012. 
 <http://www.stephaniegomes.com/2011/06/speech-to-contra-costa-
 taxpayers.html>. 
"The Orange County Bankruptcy: Who's Next?" Research Brief 11 (1998). PPIC. The 
 Public Policy Institute of California, Apr. 1998. Web. 22 Mar. 2012. 
 <http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_498MBRB.pdf>. 
United States of America versus Larry P. Langford. United States Court of Appeals for 
 the Eleventh Circuit. U.S. Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit. 5 Aug. 2011.United 
 States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District. United States Court of Appeals 
 for the Eleventh District, 5 Aug. 2011. Web. 22 Mar. 2011.
 <http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201011076.pdf>. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  44       
 
 
 
VIII. Appendix 
 
Table 1. Benford’s Law: Expected Digital Frequencies 
 Digit  1st Place 2nd Place  
 0    .11968   
 1  .30103  .11389   
 2  .17609  .19882   
 3  .12494  .10433   
 4  .09691  .10031   
 5  .07918  .09668 
 6  .06695  .09337   
 7  .05799  .09035   
 8  .05115  .08757   
 9  .04576  .08500   
 
Source: Nigrini, 1996  
 
Table 2. Digits and Conformity Range 
Digits  Range   Conclusion 
First Digits 0.000 to 0.006  Close conformity 
   0.006 to 0.012  Acceptable conformity 
   0.012 to 0.015  Marginally acceptable conformity 
   Above 0.015  Nonconformity 
 
Second Digits 0.000 to 0.008  Close conformity 
   0.008 to 0.010  Acceptable conformity 
   0.010 to 0.012  Marginally acceptable conformity 
   Above 0.012  Nonconformity 
 
First-Two Digits 0.0000 to 0.0012 Close conformity 
   0.0012 to 0.0018 Acceptable conformity 
   0.0018 to 0.0022 Marginally acceptable conformity 
   Above 0.0022  Nonconformity 
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Figure 1. Jefferson County 2005 First Digits 
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Figure 2. Jefferson County 2005 Second Digits 
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Figure 3. Jefferson County 2005 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 4. Jefferson County 2006 First Digits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000	  
0.050	  
0.100	  
0.150	  
0.200	  
0.250	  
0.300	  
0.350	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	  
PR
O
PO
R
TI
O
N
 
FIRST DIGITS Actual	   Benford	  
  49       
 
 
 
Figure 5. Jefferson County 2006 Second Digits 
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Figure 6. Jefferson County 2006 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 7. Jefferson County 2007 First Digits 
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Figure 8. Jefferson County 2007 Second Digits 
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Figure 9. Jefferson County 2007 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 10. Jefferson County 2008 First Digits 
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Figure 11. Jefferson County 2008 Second Digits 
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Figure 12. Jefferson County 2008 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 13. Jefferson County 2009 First Digits 
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Figure 14. Jefferson County 2009 Second Digits 
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Figure 15. Jefferson County 2009 First-Two Digits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000	  
0.020	  
0.040	  
0.060	  
0.080	  
0.100	  
0.120	  
0.140	  
10	   20	   30	   40	   50	   60	   70	   80	   90	  
PR
O
PO
R
TI
O
N
 
FIRST-TWO DIGITS Actual	   Benford	  
  60       
 
 
 
Figure 16. Jefferson County 2010 First Digits 
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Figure 17. Jefferson County 2010 Second Digits 
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Figure 18. Jefferson County 2010 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 19. Jefferson County 2005-2010 First Digits 
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Figure 20. Jefferson County 2005-2010 Second Digits 
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Figure 21. Jefferson County 2005-2010 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 22. Vallejo City 2003 First Digits 
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Figure 23. Vallejo City 2003 Second Digits 
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Figure 24. Vallejo City 2003 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 25. Vallejo City 2004 First Digits 
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Figure 26. Vallejo City 2004 Second Digits 
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Figure 27. Vallejo City 2004 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 28. Vallejo City 2005 First Digits 
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Figure 29. Vallejo City 2005 Second Digits 
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Figure 30. Vallejo City 2005 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 31. Vallejo City 2006 First Digits 
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Figure 32. Vallejo City 2006 Second Digits 
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Figure 33. Vallejo City 2006 First-Two Digits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000	  
0.020	  
0.040	  
0.060	  
0.080	  
0.100	  
0.120	  
0.140	  
10	   20	   30	   40	   50	   60	   70	   80	   90	  
PR
O
PO
R
TI
O
N
 
FIRST-TWO DIGITS Actual	   Benford	  
  78       
 
 
 
Figure 34. Vallejo City 2007 First Digits 
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Figure 35. Vallejo City 2007 Second Digits 
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Figure 36. Vallejo City 2007 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 37. Vallejo City 2008 First Digits 
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Figure 38. Vallejo City 2008 Second Digits 
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Figure 39. Vallejo City 2008 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 40. Vallejo City 2003-2008 First Digits 
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Figure 41. Vallejo City 2003-2008 Second Digits 
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Figure 42. Vallejo City 2003-2008 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 43. Orange County 1989 First Digits 
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Figure 44. Orange County 1989 Second Digits 
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Figure 45. Orange County 1989 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 46. Orange County 1990 First Digits 
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Figure 47. Orange County 1990 Second Digits 
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Figure 48. Orange County 1990 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 49. Orange County 1991 First Digits 
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Figure 50. Orange County 1991 Second Digits 
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Figure 51. Orange County 1991 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 52. Orange County 1992 First Digits 
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Figure 53. Orange County 1992 Second Digits 
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Figure 54. Orange County 1992 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 55. Orange County 1993 First Digits 
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Figure 56. Orange County 1993 Second Digits 
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Figure 57. Orange County 1993 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 58. Orange County 1994 First Digits 
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Figure 59. Orange County 1994 Second Digits 
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Figure 60. Orange County 1994 First-Two Digits 
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Figure 61. Orange County 1989-1994 First Digits 
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Figure 62. Orange County 1989-1994 Second Digits 
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Figure 63. Orange County 1989-1994 First-Two Digits 
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